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Abstract
The objective of this thesis was to determine if line-haul rates are impacted by bid type, and if
aggregation of bidding lanes can reduce costs for both shippers and carriers. Using regression
analysis, we developed a model to isolate and test the cost effects that influence line-haul rate for
long-haul shipments. We have determined that aggregation of low-volume lanes from point-to-
point lanes to aggregated lanes can provide costs savings when lanes with origins and destinations
in close proximity to each other can be bundled. In addition, bidding out region-to-region lanes
can supplement point-to-point lanes by reducing the need to turn to the spot market. The model
shows that bundling lanes can provide significant cost savings to a shipper because contract lanes
of any type are on average less costly than spot moves. This thesis provides guidelines and
suggestions for aggregation when creating bids during the first stage of the truckload procurement
process.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Chris Caplice
Title: Executive Director, Center for Transportation and Logistics
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1 Introduction
The US commercial truckload market generates over $320B in revenue (Standard &
Poor's, 2010). Truckload rates for shippers are generally procured either annually or bi-
annually through a bidding process. While shipments move from a single point to a
single point, they can be classified more broadly in the bidding process. For example, a
shipment from Boston to Minneapolis can be defined in a bid in many ways, to include:
specific address to specific address; by zip code, 02110 to 55421, Boston to Minneapolis;
3-digit zip code, 021 to 554; and Massachusetts to Minnesota. The different
classifications reflect the varying geographic definitions that can be assigned to the origin
and destination of each shipment.
Our research objective is to determine the impact of various lane definitions on long-
haul, dry van, truckload line-haul rates using differing origin and destination sizes. By
defining origin and destination sizes more broadly, companies can capture higher
shipping density in a lane. However, larger origin and destination regions can lead to
higher empty miles following or preceding a load. Our thesis uses linear regression to
explore how this additional shipping density affects the price of the shipments in that lane
and whether this additional density results in cost savings.
As the size of the origin or destination increases, the total number of shipments
moving between those two points will increase because more shipments will be included.
Our thesis will examine if the price of the original shipment defined as a lane from
Boston to Minneapolis changes when it is defined as a lane from Massachusetts to
Minnesota or some region size in between. We will assess how defining lanes differently
can impact pricing. Going forward we will refer to this impact as "economies of
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aggregation". By aggregation we mean combining multiple shipments with somewhat
common or close by origins or destination into a single lane for the purpose of collecting
a rate driving a bid.
In for-hire truckload (TL) transportation, loads can be bid out using a variety of lane
definitions. A shipper could potentially bid out the origin and destination as any
geographic area depending on what best suits its needs. However, our data shows that
most shippers default to point-to-point bids for their lanes. As will be described in
further detail later, our data includes over half a million points. After testing our data we
found that it is consistent with general market trends and we will therefore assume that
the dataset is a reasonable sample of the U.S. truckload market.
It is unclear if the current bidding strategy provides the best value for shippers and
carriers. Our data set shows that most of these point-to-point lanes extremely low
volume. Low-volume lanes, with fewer than 15 loads per year, constitute over 85% of
the lanes in this study. Could companies use aggregation techniques to save money?
The TL market has three distinctive features that make the economies of aggregation
important: cost plus pricing, Economies of Scope, and two-level procurement. As
discussed later, TL is a highly competitive market with extremely low margins. Thus,
most TL pricing is cost-plus. For example, the line-haul cost for a shipment going from
Los Angeles to Salt Lake City is mainly dictated by the distance traveled. The cost is also
impacted by the Economies of Scope, or the interdependency between lanes in a carrier
network. One implication of these characteristics of the truckload industry is that the line-
haul cost for two different shipments will be the same if they originate in the same
general area and terminate in the same general area - even if the actual points of pick-up
and drop-off are not identical. This phenomenon differentiates trucking procurement
from procurement in other industries. Because two different units can act identically in
terms of the procurement process, the truckload market offers a unique chance to test
how economies of aggregation affect pricing.
The truckload market differs from most other industries' in that buyers use a two-
stage procurement process. The first stage is the planning process. This is when
companies decide which lanes need to be sent to bid, how to define the lanes, and how
long the term of the contract should last. When defining the lanes companies must decide
what geographic classifications to use. Although theoretically these geographic
classifications could take any form, in our data they are defined using common
classifications of warehouse, city, 5-digit zip code, 3-digit zip code, and state. Prices are
set in the first stage.
The second stage of the truckload procurement process is the tendering- when an
actual shipment is moved. Once rates have been agreed upon in the first stage,
companies will tender the truckload services as the need arises. This stage can also
influence cost since carriers can decline to ship loads even though there is a contract in
place for those loads. Companies can also find that they need to ship loads for which
they did not establish contract pricing in the first stage. Loads for which there is no
contract rate are bid out on the spot market.
A company that makes truckload shipments can create a procurement package for
truckload carriers with shipments defined narrowly (small region to small region), or
broadly (large region to large region). Lanes can also be defined as small region to large
region and vice versa. The critical question for shippers conducting truckload
procurement projects is which route will produce the lowest total cost for the company.
While a more broadly defined lane would include more individual shipments, truckload
carriers may still choose not to lower rates. Because the region is more broadly defined,
carriers may seek to hedge against the uncertainty of where the load will actually end up
within the region or state. That is, they may believe that factors associated with a larger
region may raise their costs even as the potential for a follow-on load increases.
Figure 1 shows how 5 planned shipments can be aggregated into different bidding
lanes. A company that makes truckload shipments can create a procurement package for
truckload carriers with lanes defined narrowly or broadly. For example Figure lb creates
a state to state lane where all 5 shipments would move under the same rate. While a
more broadly defined lane would include more individual shipments, truckload carriers
may still choose not to lower rates. Figures Ic and lb use multiple levels of aggregation.
For example, if the Chicago area has a higher number of available shipments then carriers
may be willing to accept a larger aggregated area since they would expect to be able to
find another load relatively easily. If this is the case then bundling the Chicago area
might capture the aggregation possibilities in the Chicago region. (See figures 1 c and 1 d.)
Li Point to Point
y5 total lanes from specific point
to specific point
la
Refion to Rerion
*1 total lane from state to state
*5 original lanes all included in
this new lane
lb
Point to Point
*2 lanes from point to point
Region to Point
-3 lanes from region to point
1c
Point to Point
AL *2 lanes from point to point
Region to Point
+1 lane from region to point
Region to Region
id *1 lane from region to region
Figure 1: Example of Different Lane Aggregation Levels
Our research has broad applicability for companies that utilize for-hire truckload
transportation. Companies can use this research to develop their strategy for procuring
truckload rates. When reviewing truckload shipping history, companies can decide
whether or not to aggregate certain lanes into larger geographic routes or lanes in order to
capture more shipping density. Additionally, we will provide insights regarding the level
of lane aggregation that will be optimal for such companies and how the total number of
loads going between those aggregated points can influence the per unit cost. Our
findings in this project are applicable to companies who have implemented a bidding
aggregation strategy and want to evaluate their results against the findings contained
herein. The research concludes with suggestions for companies who wish to take
advantage of the findings.
1.1 Truckload Bidding Process
The bidding process for truckload transportation varies by company. However,
most truckload bidding processes share a common structure. Companies first decide
what business (lanes) will be sent out to bid and how to package the bid. They must also
decide what strategy to use when establishing the shipper-carrier relationship (Caplice
and Sheffi, 2003).
For-hire carriers who have been invited to participate then submit pricing for the
lanes as defined in the bid. After evaluating and analyzing the submitted bids, a routing
guide is created that dictates how to handle each of the lanes in the bid. As the company
needs for-hire trucking services it tenders the shipments to carriers based upon the
established routing guide. The routing guide specifies a primary and alternate carriers by
lane. If the carriers on a routing guide do not accept a load then the company must get a
"spot quote."
1.2 Motivation
Shippers trying to build an effective truckload transportation program must decide
which carriers to use and how to build an optimal routing guide. Because routing guides
typically remain in effect for one to two years, shippers and carriers are making a long-
term commitment to the rates contracted. Our data shows that line-haul rates paid for
long-haul truckload shipments are mostly based on origin and destination and line-haul
distance. In fact, total distance and location explain 90% of the variability of line-haul
cost in our model! The remaining 10% of the variability is where shippers have the
opportunity to capture cost savings. Therefore, understanding how economies of
aggregation affect truckload pricing is relevant to any company who routinely procures
truckload services.
1.3 Structure
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the for-
hire truckload trucking industry. Chapter 3 discusses the existing body of literature on
the topics of truckload trucking, for-hire trucking auctions, and complementary analysis
to that which this thesis explores. Chapter 4 outlines the methodology we used and
describes the data. Chapter 5 describes the analysis we performed to understand the data
and the model we developed to test aggregation levels. Chapter 6 offers the conclusions
that can be drawn from our model and analysis.
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2 Background: Shippers and the Spot Market
Our thesis is specifically focused on dry-van, long-haul truckloads. Dry-van
truckloads are those that do not need refrigeration and use a traditional van unit attached
to a tractor engine. We define "long-haul" as any load greater than 250 miles from origin
to destination. Any load less than 250 miles is generally not considered a long-haul load
since a carrier can typically deliver the load and return home in one day. Our thesis will
not include any analysis of other types of truckload shipping, such as refrigerated,
flatbeds, curtain vans, or intermodal. Short-haul trucking is driven by more regional
influences that will not be explored here. It is hoped that the same techniques developed
in this thesis could provide a foundation for others seeking to extrapolate the findings
here to specialty truckload markets.
Because this research deals specifically with bidding strategy surrounding volume
aggregation, it is also important to understand how trucking services are procured and
rates are established. Below is a brief introduction to these elements.
2.1 For-Hire Truckload Shipping
The trucking industry is both large and fragmented. Trucking represents 83% of
the United States commercial freight transportation market (S&P, 2010). The high level
of fragmentation and lack of dominant industry players is due in part to low barriers to
entry and exit (IBIS World, 2010). For example, the trucking industry is made up of both
private carriage and for-hire trucking. The for-hire sector includes both truckload (TL)
and less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers. The American Trucking Association estimates
the private carriage sector to account for $288 billion in 2008 (S&P, 2010). Outside
organizations contract with for-hire carriers to move freight at a pre-determined rate.
Truckload freight typically moves in loads greater than 10,000 pounds, which is the
breakpoint where the variable costs of LTL shipments exceed the fixed costs of TL
shipment (Mulqueen, 2006). This thesis project focuses solely on for-hire truckload
carriers.
Breakdown of US Commercial Freight Trasportation Market
Type Total Spend ($ in Billions) % of Total
US Trucking Business 660 83%
For-hire Carriers 372 47%
Truckload 320 40%
Less-than-truckload 52 7%
Private Carriage 288 36%
Non-trucking Freight 135 17%
Total 795 100%
Table 1: US Trucking Market based upon Survey by Standard & Poor's (S&P, 2010)
S&P's survey also reported that in 2008 for-hire carriers generated $372 billion in
revenues. Therefore, these revenues make up 56% of the motor carrier market. $320
billion of this business was generated from the TL shipments and the remaining portion
from LTL.
The for-hire TL market is dominated by private carriers. "The industry is
dominated by owner-operators, with 88.0% of all establishments being non-employers"
(IBISWorld, 2010). This means that the vast majority of players in the for-hire trucking
industry are owner-operators, who are often hired as subcontractors by larger carriers,
such as J.B. Hunt. Carriers operating more than one vehicle account for only 12% of the
total market. S&P reports that the largest publically traded carrier in 2008 was J.B. Hunt
Transport Services, with revenues of $3.7 billion in 2008. The largest private TL carrier
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was Schneider National Inc. which also had $3.7 billion in 2008 revenues. Combined,
these two carriers only account for a little over 2% of the U.S. for-hire TL market in
2008.
2.2 Contract Lanes and Routing
To ensure that there will be carriers available for their shipments, shippers
typically contract with multiple for-hire carriers, and they set rates for specific lanes.
These will be referred to going forward as contract lanes. If a shipper wishes to ship
something on a lane for which there is no contract, they can solicit a spot quote from
carriers. This rate is valid only for a specific shipment at a specific time. It does not
become part of the contracted rate structure for the shipper. Both shippers and carriers
can be reluctant to contract lanes for which there will likely be low volume. Contracted
lanes are often not collectively exhaustive, so shipments that fall outside of the route
guide must be bid out on the spot market.
Contract lane rates are usually for the line-haul, that is, the travel from origin door
to destination door. The miles that the carrier has to drive with an empty truck ("empty
miles") either to pick up the load or after delivering the load, are not the responsibility of
the shipper. However, when pricing a lane, a carrier will factor estimated empty miles
into the bid. Carriers try to maximize their fleet's utilization and therefore seek to
minimize the total empty miles traveled. Vehicle utilization is measured by the ratio of
Loaded Miles (Standard & Poor's, 2010). As the geographic area of the origin, destination,
Total Miles
or both, increases for a given lane, the carriers will try to estimate the average empty
miles required to service the load. Loads that require a carrier to travel significant
distances at the origin or destination are commonly understood to result in a carrier
quoting a higher rate or declining a load (Mulqueen, 2006). The key question of this
thesis is whether aggregation can optimize the costs of driving more empty miles and
give carriers the benefits of more lane volume. While more volume can make a lane
more profitable to a carrier, driving more empty miles due to a broadly defined origin or
destination can also offset profitability.
Table 2 below represents a hypothetical routing guide. Assuming that this routing
guide is complete for all shipments originating in Boston, this particular company would
have four contract lanes, Boston to Los Angeles, Boston to Atlanta, Boston to Chicago,
and Boston to the state of Utah. For each one of the lanes there is a list of carriers under
contract rates. This hypothetical routing guide also includes price and commitment level
between shipper and carrier. Any truckload shipment not explicitly defined in this
routing guide would require a spot quote. For example, a shipment originating in Boston
and going to Dallas would not have a contract rate in place and would need a spot rate.
Furthermore, a shipment going from Boston to Thousand Oaks, CA would also require a
spot rate despite its proximity to the Los Angeles market.
Sequence Carrier Name Cost Commitment
1 Carrier A $3,000.00 50%
2 Carrier B $3,100.00 25%
3 Carrier C $3,200.00 13%
4 Carrier D $3,250.00 12%
Sequence Carrier Name Cost Commitment
1 Carrier A $950.00 34%
2 Carrier B $1,050.00 33%
3 Carrier C $1,100.00 33%
Sequence Carrier Name Cost Commitment
1 Carrier A $800.00 75%
2 Carrier B $1,050.00 13%
3 Carrier C $1,075.00 12%
Sequence Carrier Name Cost Commitment
1 Carrier A $2,100.00 50%
2 Carrier B $2,300.00 25%
3 Carrier C $2,850.00 25%
Table 2: Example of hypothetical routing guide for points and region
2.3 Capacity Commitments and Load Rejection
A typical routing guide might also contain a capacity commitment as shown in
Table 2 above. A capacity commitment requires carriers to haul a defined percentage of
loads over the contracted period. This allows the shipper to maintain flexibility to handle
the variation in actual demand and commits the carrier to making the established
resources available for each lane. However, according to our contact at a major third
party logistics provider, even when capacity commitments exist, they are often not
strictly observed, by either the shipper or carrier. Capacity commitments provide more of
a guideline of expected volume rather than a strict requirement for either party.
Capacity commitments are necessary and important in part at least because for-
hire carriers have the ability to decline loads as mentioned earlier. Capacity commitments
aid shippers in designing their networks and forecasting demand. Carriers reject loads
based upon limited capacity or because the carrier simply does not want to haul that
particular load, typically because it is not profitable for the for-hire carrier at a specific
point in time (Mulqueen, 2006). Due to shifting market conditions and changes within
individual companies, certain lanes can become unprofitable to carriers even after a
contract between shipper and carrier has been established. A lane can be unprofitable for
a carrier because of insufficient volume on the lane. Given our thesis focus, it is
important to understand carriers' ability to reject loads and the influence lane volume can
have on those decisions.
Rejection frequency increases as the carriers gain more power in the buyer/seller
relationship (Mulqueen, 2006). Because the balance of power can shift between carriers
and shippers depending on market conditions, the frequency of load rejection can also
vary depending on carriers' need for revenue. Harding (2005) estimated the cost of
rejecting a load to be between 2% and 7% of freight costs. Over 25% of the loads in
Harding's research were rejected by the primary carrier (Harding 2005). Over the two
years considered in this study, the rejection rate was 26%, with 32% of loads rejected in
2008 and 19% rejected in 2009. Possibly the reason for the rejection rate reduction in
2009 was due to general market conditions. Compared with 2005, 2009's economy was
weaker. Presumably for-hire carriers would be less willing to reject a load while market
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conditions were unfavorable. With a quarter of the loads tendered being rejected, and
lane volume contributing to this result, the importance of understanding how to aggregate
low-volume lanes becomes extremely relevant to shipping companies.
2.4 Further Explanation of Spot Market
Spot bids play an important part in this research and in the stability of contract
lanes. Having contract lanes is typically preferred to exclusively using spot bids due to
the difficulty in consistently finding trucks and uncertainty of price. As stated above,
shippers must obtain a spot quote for every individual shipment if no contract rate is in
place. Depending on the company's system for soliciting requests for spot quotes in the
market, this process can take differing amounts of time and effort. Prices in the spot
market can also vary depending on the lane, time of year, availability of carrier, and
many other factors. Even if a company frequently bids loads in the spot market and is
therefore able to predict price, choosing to use the spot market for truckload inherently
has more risk in price variability than using a contract rate. However, companies often
rely on spot quotes to assess whether its current contract rates are still competitive in the
market or if there is reason to renegotiate rates. For example, referring to Table 2, if this
company wanted to check the competitiveness of its Boston to Atlanta rates it may seek
spot bids to ensure that the three contract lanes it has in its routing guide are still
competitive in the market place. This exercise is not necessarily especially practical,
however, because a carrier has little impetus to go outside the routing guide, which may
be over 20 carriers deep for a particular lane. This study will evaluate whether spot bids
consistently influence line-haul rates.
2.5 Economies of Scale, Scope, and Aggregation
Economies of scale define the impact volume has on average unit price. In TL
transportation, economies of scale claim that the addition of volume on a lane will lower
the average line-haul unit price. If more volume were added to a Boston to Dallas lane,
economies of scale predict that the average unit price for the line-haul portion would
decrease. While our thesis deals directly with volume on lanes, it is not focused on the
effect of adding or subtracting volume from existing lanes. Rather, our focus will deal
with the impact of redefining lane boundaries so that more loads are included in a lane.
Specifically, aggregating low-volume lanes into newly defined lanes will be analyzed.
Economies of scope hinge on interdependency between lanes in a carrier network.
Carriers face uncertainty in securing a follow-on load, both in terms of distance travelled
to the follow-on and time spent securing it. The costs of time and distance between loads
are built into the tender rate that a carrier generates. When a carrier is better able to
predict the probability of a follow-on load, the carrier can also better estimate the costs of
interdependency. The greater the probability of a follow-on load, the lower the cost to
the carrier and the shipper. Consequently, when a carrier's network can be optimized, it
can realize economies of scope (Caplice 1996). For example, a network that covers loads
moving from point A to point B would likely be positively influenced by the addition of
loads moving from point B or to point A. Truckload pricing is greatly influenced by the
"interdependency problem" (Caplice and Sheffi, 2003) due to economies of scope.
Truckload carriers who are unsure of the availability of backhaul loads may hedge their
pricing to account for this uncertainty. While we will explore the effects of empty miles
travelled at the origin and destination, we will not explicitly be exploring the effects of
economies of scope.
This thesis examines how the cost of a lane defined as Boston to Dallas compares
to a broader lane defined as Massachusetts to 3-digit zip code 752 (which includes
Dallas). Practically speaking, it is assumed that the economies of scope that are
embedded within the truckload transportation network deeply influence TL rates. While
our model does not focus on economies of scope they are generally measured using
regional values at the state, 3 digit zip, or other levels. This effect will be discussed later
in more depth.
We will focus solely on the impact lane aggregation has on TL rates due to
economies of aggregation. The focus of this thesis is on the effects of aggregating
bidding lanes to form larger shipping corridors. Economies of aggregation imply that as
the size of origins or destinations of a lane decreases, the unit price for that specific lane
will decrease. Aggregation does not deal with the addition of new shipments to a lane.
Rather it involves the reengineering of lane boundaries at the origin and the destination to
include more loads that already exist in a company's portfolio of shipments.
This paper will focus more on the impact of aggregation on pricing and will seek
to isolate those effects relative to line-haul rates. However, a complete explanation of
influencing drivers to line-haul truckload pricing should include careful analysis of the
impact of backhaul availability.
2.6 Low-volume Lanes for Shippers
Low-volume lanes create a problem for both shippers and carriers. Shippers are
unsure of how best to bid out these lanes since they typically result in higher costs.
Carriers that contract low-volume lanes can have difficulty fitting these lanes into their
existing networks. If carriers are unable to find a backhaul (the connection between the
end of one load and the beginning of the follow-on load), they risk having to drive the
full length of haul without a revenue-generating load at worst, or traveling a long distance
for a load. This results in wasted time, labor, and money. Shippers can be penalized in
their contracts for these lanes, paying a premium to offset the carriers' extra costs. While
the time cost will vary from company to company, the lack of contract line-haul rates can
be partly quantified by any premium paid in spot rates. Our data shows that there is a
premium for using the spot market instead of establishing contract rates. Aggregation
could be a solution to paying this premium.
If shippers can find a way to increase carriers' certainty on low-volume lanes,
then this could lead to lower rates for the shipper and better network optimization for the
carriers. One possible method to achieve this is to bundle low-volume lanes, defining the
lane by using larger origin and destination areas, creating a more collectively exhaustive
set of contracted rates. We will address whether aggregating low-volume lanes together
will be viewed any differently by carriers than a collection of point-to-point lanes.
Companies seeking to understand how to decrease transportation costs by
aggregating low-volume lanes into specific bundles should understand the relationship
between the quantity of loads on a lane, the total distance of the lane, and the expected
area the carrier will drive empty to pick up or deliver the load. Understanding the
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relationship between these variables will help to formulate a bidding strategy that will
control the total cost of truckload transportation while maximizing the efforts of the
employees responsible for running the operation.
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3 Literature Review
We conducted a review of the literature related to truckload bidding processes. We
also interviewed industry experts who added key insights regarding their observations
regarding the impact of region size on line-haul rates. This section reviews our research
findings and the relevance of our paper's findings in the field of study.
There was no specific research about the impact of region size and aggregation for
a lane on truckload rates. However, there is a good deal of material regarding
combinatorial auctions, impact of backhauls on contract truckload rates, and industry
practices and standards for truckload rates.
Our literature review is comprised of four categories: literature that contextualizes
our project in the broader TL industry; existing efforts to optimize a shipping network;
research that took a similar approach to a truckload bidding problem; and truckload
carrier economics.
3.1 Industry Context
A significant body of literature exists that characterizes the truckload industry.
Caplice and Sheffi (2006) provided a thorough grounding in current bidding practices.
Hubbard (2001) explains market factors that are very relevant to our research. The
thinner the depth of the local market, the greater the chance of a spot bid on long haul
routes. That is, the fewer carriers that operate along a given lane, the less depth there can
be in the routing guide. This relates to problems with finding backhauls. This effect is
not present when local markets are thick. It provides a clear explanation of the factors
affecting long-haul shipping. A decentralized market and less than ideal information
about short term supply and demand for a given route are key factors affecting a carrier's
experience in a given market. To coordinate backhauls for outbound freight requires a
substantial time investment, about 60 man-hours when markets are thick, and two to four
times that time when markets are thin (372). This research has helped us characterize
some of the factors affecting low-volume lane pricing. Hubbard also contextualizes our
research by helping us to understand the factors that affect carrier decisions in low-
volume markets.
The ratio of inbound to outbound shipments has a strong impact on common
carriage use- the relationship between common carriage use and ratio of inbound to
outbound is positively correlated and becomes stronger as the ratio increases (384).
Hubbard's findings support our hypothesis that the probability of a backhaul is a
significant factor in lane pricing, and would provide an incentive to aggregation.
3.2 Existing Research
The existing body of research about optimization focuses on combinatorial
auctions. Combinatorial auctions are a type of bidding where the goal is to optimize the
carrier's network. Traditionally, shippers accepted or rejected carriers' bids on a lane-by-
lane basis. This made it very difficult for carriers to optimize their networks. Carriers
aim for continuous flow within their networks. That is, they would like their drivers to be
able to move from point A to point B to point C back to point A without significant
detours or interruptions. Carriers can optimize their networks across multiple shippers.
However, combinatorial auctions make creating an optimal network easier for carriers
because shippers bid on groups of lanes rather than individual lanes. Caplice (2006)
provides an overview of this process. This describes the electronic bidding process, as
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well as current practices in for-hire Truckload shipping. Combinatorial auctions occur
later in the bidding process than our research. Combinatorial auctions bundle lanes to
increase acceptance by shippers. Our research focuses on creating more optimized lanes
which will in turn give better inputs to combinatorial auctions. We also focus more on
the potential benefits to shippers rather than carriers. Even though we do not analyze
package bids, how carriers respond to lane bundling is interesting in understanding the
impact of economies of aggregation.
Sheffi (2004) provides a clear description of the optimization problem that
carriers must solve in creating bids for combinatorial auctions and how the transportation
services procurement process functions. It also explains clearly the ways that efficiencies
can be achieved in the network. Economies of scale can be difficult to achieve, but
realizing economies of scope can lead to substantial cost savings. Combinatorial
auctions have been a focus for achieving these economies of scope, and we believe
similar economies of aggregation can be achieved by optimizing lanes.
Mulqueen (2006) focuses on identifying how to choose between using contract
carriers versus using a private fleet. Some of the key variables in deciding whether to
privatize a fleet are corridor volume and load variability. In doing the analysis,
Mulqueen finds virtually no correlation between high lane volume and lower rates. He
could not assess in his project whether there is a correlation between overall shipper TL
volume and lower prices from carriers. Mulqueen did find that shippers give significant
discounts on lanes that terminate in a known load origination point. That is, carriers will
discount freight if they know that the destination of the load is headed directly to another
shipping facility from which that carrier will haul another load. Even if the carrier only
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had to travel an additional 5% of the distance of the first load away from the destination
point, the difference in cost was significant (45-47). Our analysis is solely on contract
carriers and how to address low-volume lanes, but Mulqueen's research provides a
baseline understanding of correlation between lane volume and price.
Zhelev (2004) provides a model for estimating contract rates vs. average spot
rates for his data sample. He also finds that spot rates can be as much as 50-100% higher
than contract rates. He states that spot rates are 20% higher than contract rates. Zhelev
finds that the underlying factor that drives savings in TL transportation is the distribution
of loads throughout the year (47). The relationship between contract and spot rates is
very important to our analysis. For customers who have a defined transportation strategy
in place, spot lanes are inherently low volume, as they were not included in the usually
extensive bidding process that shippers undertake. Spot lanes are typically point-to-point;
they represent disaggregation in the lane definition continuum. Since we are evaluating
how best to aggregate low-volume lanes, understanding the cost tradeoffs between spot
lanes and contracted lanes is critical to our analysis.
Harding (2005) provides a method for determining the amount of additional
freight expenditures as a result of the frequency and severity of unplanned freight. This
contributed to our overall understanding of the cost factors that affect trucking costs.
One of the goals of this paper is to enable shippers and carriers to reduce the amount of
unplanned freight by making lanes more efficient and more collectively exhaustive.
3.3 Similar Analysis of Truckload Procurement
Caldwell and Fisher's (2008) study of the impact of lead time on truckload
transportation rates provided a model to approach the problem of assessing the impact of
bidding elements on truckload rates. While their thesis examined lead time's impact on
rates, we will use the same methodology to study the impact of lane aggregation on rates.
Their work contributed a great deal to our understanding of the data structure. Like this
project, theirs was a procurement problem, and consequently involved similar
methodology for the model's foundation. The model in this project reflects similar
underlying assumptions about which elements most affect truckload line-haul pricing in
the United States.
3.4 Truckload Carrier Economics
Caplice and Sheffi (2003) explain the impact of backhaul loads on truckload pricing.
When carriers create a network that utilizes backhauls to drive down costs, they are
leveraging economies of scope rather than scale. When a carrier is unable to create a
network that accurately estimates the connection costs, that is, when they are unable to
create economies of scope with certainty, it can hedge its potential costs by increasing a
TL carrier's price (Caplice and Sheffi, 112).
3.5 Foundations for Economies of Aggregation
Our review of the literature outlined above led to the following key insights.
These insights are helpful to our understanding of the impact of economies of
aggregation. Our thesis will fill a gap in existing research by evaluating an earlier stage
of the procurement process, particularly about the correlation between lane volume and
line-haul rates. Existing research enhanced our understanding of the TL, for-hire market
and helped us to better frame our objectives, particularly understanding how our research
would enhance current optimization methods by creating a higher quality input.
4 Methodology and Description of Data
In order to investigate the impact of aggregation on total truckload transportation
costs, we used two years of transaction data from the Transportation Management Center
(TMC), a fee-based, staffed Transportation Management Service, at C.H. Robinson
(CHR), a major third-party logistics provider (3PL). The data contains customers
comprised of dry-van, truckload shipments for the years 2008 and 2009 originating from
the 48 contiguous United States and Washington, D.C. with destinations in the 50 states
and Canada from eight different firms using a common TMS. We analyzed long-haul
shipments within the 48 contiguous states and Washington, D.C.
Specifically we excluded loads from the dataset with any of the following
characteristics:
* Origin or destination outside of the continental US
e Length of haul < 250 miles
0 TMC customers with fewer than 2,000 loads over the two year period
0 Less-than-truckload shipments
e Rate less than $0.70 per mile
e Rate greater than $3.50 per mile
e Blank entries or loads with other obvious data entry errors
After the data had been cleaned, we were left with 495,394 loads out of our original
set of 1,101,590. The customer count was reduced from 23 to eight. Between them, the
shippers use a total of 618 carriers.
4.1 Data Profiling
To ensure that the data was a representative sample, we conducted various
analyses after preparing the data. We wanted to understand how the data was distributed
and identify basic characteristics of the customers.
Since we are addressing whether or not to aggregate lanes, we are interested in
knowing how the shipments are distributed across lanes. Figure 2 shows that 85.5% of
the loads are distributed across lanes with 15 loads per year or less. Only slightly more
than 3% of the lanes have more than 150 loads per year. This data includes all of the
carriers in the system and all of the customers. Therefore, this analysis represents trends
in our data as a whole and is not unique to specific shipping companies or customers.
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Figure 3 shows the distribution of length of haul by lane. It appears that the
length of haul follows a truncated normal distribution. However, since loads under 250
miles and over 3,000 miles were dropped from the final data set, the lower and upper
bounds of the dataset were artificially imposed. The length of haul ranges from 250
miles to 2,998 miles. About two thirds of the loads are between 282 and 1,032 miles,
within one standard deviation of the mean of 657 miles. That is, of the 495,394 total
loads, about 336,868 fall in this range, with almost all of the remaining 158,526 loads
falling between 1,1033 and 2,998 miles.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Length of Haul
Figure 4 shows the distribution of cost per mile by load. The mean of $1.51 and
standard deviation of $0.44 mean that 68% of tender rates have a cost per mile between
$1.07 and $1.95, assuming a normal distribution.
Distribution of Cost per Mile for Truckload Transportation
Mean - $1.5091
20,00.0 Std. Dev. $.43563
0
E
.15,000.0-
I-
s0,000.0-
z
$00
III
$1.00 $2.00
Cost Per Mile
$"- - 4.
$3.00 $4.00
Figure 4: Distribution of Cost per Mile for Truckload Transportation
We sought to understand customer characteristics to better evaluate the model.
We wanted to be conscious of the relative weight of an individual customer in the dataset.
The number of loads per customer gave us a snapshot of how much each customer
contributed to the data set. While we had eliminated customers with fewer than 2,000
loads per year in the years examined, Table 3 illustrates that the number of loads per
customer covers a wide range. Customer I accounts for 40% of the total loads, with
customer 2 accounting for 20% more. Although customers 1 and 2 account for the
majority of the loads, the characteristics of these customers mirror the characteristics of
the data set as a whole.
1 201,443 675 $ 1.61 3219 2%
2 104,983 593 $ 1.38 3117 3%
6 9,325 521 $ 1.34 1240 13%
7 52,728 704 $ 1.57 18643 35%
11 43,551 620 $ 1.47 3876 9%
16 35,797 634 $ 1.50 400 1%
17 4,647 1111 $ 1.36 280 6%
24E 42,920 712 $ 1.36 721 2%
Table 3: Customer Profiles
Figure 5 shows that while the customers differ in volume shipped there is
consistency in how the average length of haul affects the cost per mile. The one outlier in
Figure 5 is customer 17. Customer 17's average length of haul is significantly greater
than the other customers without any significant change in the cost per mile.
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...... .........................
As seen in Table 3, most customers use the spot market sparingly. The notable
exception is Customer 7, who uses the spot market for about 35% of its total loads. The
total number of spot bids relative to the total number of loads shipped, 31,496 out of
495,394 loads, is substantial. The proportion of the total loads bid on the spot market
suggests that it is necessary to consider contract type as a variable in the linear regression.
Each lane was bid out as a specific type of origin or destination. Figure 6 shows the
breakdown of bids by origin-destination combination. Table shows bids by origin type
and destination type, with City to City clearly the most popular type of bid. Origins were
bid as City in almost 90% of total bids. The next most popular bid type was spot bids.
The overwhelming majority of bids use point origin or destination types, either 5Zip,
City, or Warehouse, a specific address, which suggests that point is the default for
carriers. Specifically, the bid types suggest, and CHR confirms, that customers typically
have specific origin points in mind. The strong presence of spot bids suggests that the
lanes that the shippers bid out are not collectively exhaustive, necessitating extensive spot
bidding.
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Figure 6: Total Loads by Bid Type
Destination Quote Type
Point Region
Spot Warehouse 5Zip City 3ZIp State TOTAL
Origin Spot 31,496 - - - - - 31,496
Quote Warehouse - 1,058 - 22 - - 1,080
Tp Point 5Zip - - 2,419 - - - 2,419
City - - - 403,020 18,113 20,902 442,035
3Zip - - - 59 12,696 312 13,067
Region State - - - 1,798 22 3,477 5,297
TOTAL 31,496 1,058 2,419 404,899 30,831 24,691 495,394
Table: Loads by Origin and Destination Bid Type
5,000 10,000
.................... . .. .
.. ...... .... ...
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5 Analysis of Data
This section explains the analysis of the data and the results. Using multi-variable
ordinary least squares regression we tested over 50 different base models to show the
effects of lane aggregation. This section discusses the various models tested and explains
the rationale for eliminating certain versions in favor of others.
5.1 Regression Analysis
We used ordinary least-squares multiple linear regression in statistically testing all
three models. A linear regression model assumes the following (Bertsimas and Freund,
2004):
Y= po + 1x 1+ 2x 2 + ... + pkXk+ C,
where E is a normally distributed random variable. The mean, p, of C equals 0 and has a
standard deviation of Y. po is a constant term and estimates the intercept of the predicted
model's path with the vertical axis. P1, P2, ... , pf represent the coefficients on the
independent variables whose values determine the dependent variable Y. The
independent variables are represented by x1, ... , Xk. In our model the dependent variable,
Y, is the line-haul rate in dollars per load. The independent variables include distance,
geographic origin and destination, spot bid status, and the other methods variables
captured aggregation influence.
The measurement used to evaluate how well the linear regression predicts the
value of the dependent variable is the coefficient of determination. The coefficient of
2 2determination is represented by R . R assesses the model's ability to predict dependent
variable by evaluating the proportion of total variation of the values of the dependent
variable that is accounted for by the regression equation of the independent variables
(Bertsimas and Freund, 2004).
5.2 Building the Base Model
The purpose of our base model was to estimate line-haul contract rates for the
U.S. for-hire trucking market. As stated earlier, line-haul rates are mostly driven by
distance travelled and regional effects. Therefore, these factors were included as
independent variables but others were also added so that the effects of aggregation are
most clearly seen. The six independent variables used to make up the base model are
listed in Table 5 with a brief explanation of each. Further explanation for inclusion in the
base model is below.
Variable Description
Length of Haul Total direct miles traveled frfr origin to destination
Spot Indication whether load was sent based on a spot quote
SpotDist Total miles traveled for loads sentas asot bid
Inverse Volum Measurement of the total volume on lane. Calculated as 1/total annual lane volume
Origin States Record of state of origin for each load. 48 continental US states and Washington D.C.
Destination St4 Record of state of destination for each load. 48 continental US states and Washington D.C.
Table 4: Description of Base Model Variables
5.2.1 Length of Haul
Length of haul is the factor with the single largest impact on price for long haul,
truckload shipments. Length of haul explained 72% of the variability in the cost per load
in all of the regressions run. This result is consistent with long term industry findings
about the importance of length of haul in truckload trucking. The importance of length of
haul provides a strong and consistent foundation for the model, because the majority of
cost is based on this one factor. As explained earlier, trucking operates on essentially a
cost-plus pricing model based on length of haul and geography.
In the model, length of haul is represented by Miles, which shows the cost per
mile that must be added to the constant. Cost per mile was about $1.15 across all runs.
5.2.2 Regional Effects
Regional effects explain 17% of variability (R2) value of the dependent variable.
In the model, regional effects were evaluated using 98 variables, one for each origin and
destination zone. Assessing regional effects by state allowed us to define each region
using a specific, easily identifiable area, while still being broad enough to show general
trends.
The regional effects are a measurement of economies of scope. As described
earlier, economies of scope have a significant impact on line-haul pricing. As shown in
Figure 7 and Figure 8, shippers pay a premium based on origin and destination state.
This explains 17% of the line-haul cost variance, as described earlier. As shown in the
Figure 7, for example, a carrier would pay a higher premium to ship out of Minnesota
than out of Florida. As destinations, there is a lower premium to ship into Minnesota
than Florida. The findings here are consistent with conventional wisdom about shipping
out of certain geographies. There is a higher volume of shipments originating in
Minnesota than bound for Minnesota, and the opposite is true for Florida. So, it is not
surprising that the premium would be higher to ship into Florida than Minnesota. Figure
8 shows the premium by destination state.
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Figure 7: Premium per Load by Origin State
Figure 8: Premium per Load by Destination State
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5.2.3 Equations Tested
Using the key variables described above, we used Length of Haul (Miles) and
Regional Effects (the origin and destination zones) to explain 90% of the variability in
the data set. After adding these two sets of variables we set out to add additional
variables that could explain different facets of the lane aggregation question. Because the
R2 value was already at .904, any increases in R2 were not as important as the value and
statistical significance of the coefficient variables.
5.2.4 The Base Model
The first set of variables added is listed in Table 5 below. Spot, SpotDist, and
InverseVolume were all added successively to the initial model of Miles and
Origin/Destination States. All of the coefficients for each origin and destination state are
not listed in the exhibits in the main body of the thesis. Because this thesis is concerned
with the question of the impact of aggregation, listing the coefficients for each of the
states does not help to support that goal. These can be found in Appendix 1.
The coefficients for the variables listed in Table 5 show the individual effects for
each of the variables. For example, looking at Run 4, the effect of each mile driven is to
add $1.15 to the cost of the load. In addition, if a lane only has one shipment on it over
the two-year period that the dataset represents then there will be a premium on that
specific load of $60.43. If a contracted load travels 1,000 miles and has a total of one
shipment a year on the lane then the cost of the load will be $1,498.69 (without including
the effects of origin and destination states).
RUN Number 1 2 3 4
R-Squared 91% 91% 91% 91%
(Constant) $ 303.01 $ 307.97 $ 317.91 $ 319.47
Miles $ 1.17 $ 1.17 $ 1.15 $ 1.15
Spot $ 111.08 $ 7.41 $ 3.09
SpotDist $ 0.13 $ 0.13
InverseVolume $ 60.43
Origin States Included X X X X
Destination States Included X X x x
Table 5: Base Model Development
Table 6 shows the detail behind this specific calculation. The power of the
regression's coefficients is that each variable's effect can be specifically measured as in
this example. For example, these two sample shipments demonstrate how each of the
individual variable coefficients affects the predicted price for the line-haul cost. This
specific example also demonstrates the impact of relative location on total cost. Because
Florida does not have a great deal of freight coming out of it, carriers are reluctant to go
enter because they know how difficult it will be to find a backhaul. Therefore, there is a
premium on loads going into Florida.
Chicago to Miami Miami to Chicago
Values Cost Values Cost
Constant $ 319.47 $ 319.47
Miles 1375 $1,581.25 1375 $1,581.25
Spot 0 $ - 0$ -
SpotDist 0 $ - 0 $ -
Inverse Volume 2 $ 30.21 2 $ 30.21
Origin State $ 4.20 $ (389.20)
Destination State $ 259.80 $ (226.50)
Total $2,194.93 $1,315.23
Table 6: Example of Base Model Prediction
5.3 Testing Economies of Aggregation
In this section we discuss first how to represent economies of aggregation and then
quantify the impact.
5.3.1 Representing Economies of Aggregation
In order to build a model that was detailed enough to evaluate aggregated bidding
effects, we separated each of the variable's effects. We used three general approaches to
understand aggregation's impact on truckload bidding. These three approaches tested the
effects of region size, lane volume, and empty miles distance. We first tested the impact
of region size on tender rate. The original data included the bid type in specific detail
showing whether the origin and destination points were bid as either warehouse, 5 digit
zip code, city, 3 digit zip code, or state. The relative size of the geographic region is
generally summarized in the order just listed with warehouse being the smallest
geographic point and state being the largest. Because the data included this level of
detail it made sense to test each type's effect on truckload pricing.
We also represented the effects of region size with the generic categories "point"
and "region." This was done because the differences between some of the regions were
not significant enough to warrant deep separation. The categories were thus represented
by point-to-point, point to region, region to region, and region to region. Our contact at
CHR suggest that bid types warehouse, 5 digit zip code, and city all behave like a single
point and could therefore be defined as such. The reasoning behind this distinction was
that these three areas are small enough that experienced truckload carriers will have a
very good idea of where each load will be picking up and delivering and will therefore
bid out the lane as a specific point. For 3 digit zip codes and states introduced significant
53
ambiguity for the carrier. Size of a region indicated that carriers would be forced to look
at the possibility of driving empty miles either at the origin or destination to complete the
load.
The second approach to understanding aggregation's effect on bidding is
representing the volume of loads on each lane. We defined a lane as a 5 digit zip code to
a 5 digit zip code. We used the "InverseVolume" variable to represent the effect of
adding an additional load to each lane. The inverse volume variable measures the
incremental effects of volume on rates.
The third approach was to represent the number of empty miles on each load.
Running an empty truck is often referred to as "deadheading" and can happen either at
the origin or destination of a load. We had to determine the size of each origin and
destination region, by 5 digit zip code, 3 digit zip code, and state, and then determine how
far a carrier would likely have to drive empty.
We gathered data on the square mileage of each five digit zip code from the
United States Census Bureau. We chose to use information from the Census Bureau
because it provided a complete record of square mileage for five digit zip codes for the
whole United States. This information was not readily available from any other source,
much less one so reliable. There was one major drawback to the Census data: the square
mileage includes only land area, excluding water area in a given location. However, the
measuring methodology was consistent throughout the country and provided an
exhaustive record of the nation's land area. We used this data to find the area of each
3Zip in our data, as well. We also used it to find the area of each state in our data. While
for the square mileage of each state is readily available from the U.S. Geological survey
and other reliable sources, we chose to be consistent in our area calculations. There was
some discrepancy between official square mileage at the state level and the square
mileage we found using the Census data; in each case, the Census data provided a smaller
area. However, the differences were not significant, and consistency provided a more
compelling option than precision. As stated above, all origins and destinations bid as
Warehouse, City, or 5Zip were assigned an area of zero square miles.
To capture this effect we used the centroid technique. The idea of a centroid is to
measure the average distance that a carrier would have to travel either at the origin or
destination. We estimated each load's centroid by the area of its 5 digit zip code, 3 digit
zip code, or state based on how the load was bid out. The intent was to capture the
carriers' reaction to being asked to bid on a lane knowing different levels of information
at both the origin and the destination. Empty miles were estimated for the origin,
destination, and the complete lane.
To calculate the average distance from the centroid, we assumed that a carrier
would have to move an average of half the distance from the centroid to the edge of the
zone. That is based on the assumption that the greatest distance that carrier would move
within a zone would be from the edge to the centroid, and the least would be no distance.
We assumed that the zones took a uniform shape, either square or circular, because those
two shapes made the most practical sense when estimating for driving distances. We
found it necessary to assume uniform shape for the zones as it would be unfeasible to
calculate the average distance from the centroid for the zones in their actual shapes.
There are two reasons for this. One, the shapes of the zones are so irregular that it would
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require excessive time to calculate this value for each zone. Two, information about the
shape of each zone is not readily available. Using the following calculations allowed us
to follow a quick and uniform method for calculating average distance from the centroid
in miles. We tested the average distance from the centroid using each shape separately in
the model.
For the zones as squares, we calculated the average distance from the centroid as
d = . We derived the formula as follows. We identified distance from the centroid, d,
as half the length of the side of the square that is half the area of the zone. So, length of
side equals 2d. We are assuming that half the area of the zone is also square. The area of
half the zone equals(2d) 2 = 4d 2 . This represents half the area of the zone, . So,
A= 4d2. We can then solve for d. = d 2 . So, d = .2 8 N8
We calculated the average distance from the centroid for the zones as circles
using the same methodology. We again assumed that average distance from the centroid
to be based on the distance from the center to the edge of a circle with half the area of a
zone. Using the distance, d, for the radius, the area of the circle with radius d is A =
wd 2 . Because this represents half the area of the zone, Azone = 2ird2 . A = d 2. So,27r
A
solving for d, we find d = .
There are drawbacks to these assumptions. The calculation for area of a square
region results in a longer average distance from the centroid than for a circular region
based on the basic geometry of the shapes. As with square areas of the regions, which we
know are smaller than the regions actually are, the values generated by these calculations
are imprecise, but calculated consistently.
We further defined the effect of empty miles by creating a ratio of total miles to
estimated empty miles. Variables were created for origin, destination, and the complete
lane. These variables are intended to capture the effect of empty miles and
simultaneously account for the effects of the length of the haul.
5.3.2 Quantifying the Impact of Economies of Aggregation
Calculating the effects of lane aggregation required several different approaches.
As stated earlier, these efforts can be broadly categorized as the effects of region size,
lane volume, and empty miles. The additional variables are defined in Table 7 below:
Variables Description
Point Region
RegionPoint General categorization of origin and destination as either
RegionRegion a point or a region.
OriginEmptyMilesSquare
DestEmptyMilesSquare Estimate of empty miles that TL must drive at the origin,
LaneEmptyMilesSquare destination, and total lane for square region.
OrigLHRatioSquare
DestLHRatioSquare Ratio of line-haul miles to total empty miles for square
LaneLHRatioSquare regions.
OriginEmptyMilesCircle
DestEmptyMilesCircle Estimate of empty miles that TL must drive at the origin,
LaneEmptyMilesCircle destination, and total lane for circle region.
OrigLHRatioCircle
DestLHRatioCircle Ration of line-haul miles to total empty miles for circle
LaneLHRatioCircle regions.
Table 7: Explanation of Variables
Out of the approximately 50 regressions we ran, we ultimately chose the final model
from among 10 runs. We will discuss each run individually to explain why we did or did
not choose it for the final model. A full table of the runs can be seen in Appendix 2.
As previously stated, the data for this study ranged from 2008-2009. Because of
general economic conditions in the U.S., both of those years were "down" years for
trucking. A down year is one in which there are more trucks available then freight
needing to be moved. As a result of simple supply and demand economics, this should
result in lower truckload pricing. During a down market there is less volume going to the
spot market because contract carriers are not rejecting as much business. This is
consistent with our data, which shows that spot shipments dropped by almost 80% from
2008 to 2009, from roughly 26,000 in 2008, to just under 6,000 in 2009.
The range of coefficients for Spot and Spot_Dist range from $3.25 to $13.71 and
$0.13 to $0.14 respectively. Therefore, during the 2008-9 down market, spot rates cost
more than contract rates.
We selected Run 7 as the best model for this research. Run 7 included a very
reasonable value for the InverseVolume variable as well as detailed explanatory
coefficients for both the origin and destination empty miles variables. Run 7 was chosen
over Run 9, which shows the effects of empty miles over the lane, because it isolates the
effects of empty miles at the origin and the destination even though the same overall
result is evident. Run 7 is essentially the same as Run 8 and the two are effectively
interchangeable. The only difference between the two is the assumed shape of regions.
Run 7 assumes that the regions are square, while Run 8 assumes that they are circular.
The same arguments and conclusions that will be drawn from Run 7 can also be drawn
from Run 8. Run 7 will be referred to as "the model" going forward in this paper.
RUN Number 7
R-Squared 91%
(Constant) $322.31
Miles $ 1.14
Spot $ 9.68
SpotDist $ 0.14
InverseVolume $ 26.78
OriginEmptyMilesSquare $ 0.91
DestEmptyMilesSquare $ 0.50
Origin States Included X
Destination States Included X
Figure 9: Run 7, the Model
The model provides enough information to be able to describe the effects of
aggregating low-volume lanes and gives specific numbers on both the origin and
destination of the load to help define the optimal area size. Simply defining larger areas
as "regions" and smaller areas as "points" does not give enough information for
companies to be able to optimize region or point geographic sizes. A premium tolerance
is the level of premium that a company is willing to pay per load on a specific model
variable to provide a benefit or flexibility in another way to the company. For example, a
shipper may decide to make aggregation levels large in order to reduce cost of managing
many smaller lanes. The results of the model give this company the information needed
to calculate the estimated amount that making such a decision would cost.
Run 7 also held consistent results with the base model. For Miles, Spot, SpotDist,
and InverseVolume the results were consistent with the majority of the other runs. This
cannot be said about some of the other runs. For example, the runs that switched the
empty miles variables to ratio, whether square areas or circle, experienced dramatic shifts
in the Constant, Spot, and InverseVolume variables. Run 7 did not have similar
problems in the base case.
5.3.3 Other Runs Considered
There were nine other runs that provided valid, significant results. Having chosen
Run 7, this section will examine why we did not choose the other runs. As explained
above, the results from runs for which the only difference was the region shape (Square
or Circle). This was the case for Runs 7 and 8, 9 and 10, 11 and 12, and 13 and 14.
5.3.3.1 Regional Size Effects
Run 5 shows the effects of each specific bid type on the model. City as Origin and
Destination do not appear in the regression because they are the base case for the model.
We rejected this run as we had determined that the distinctions between individual point
and region bid types were artificial. In Run 6, the individual bid types of warehouse, 5-
digit zip code, 3-digit zip code, and state are accounted for. All are self-explanatory
except for possibly warehouse. In this dataset, a warehouse was defined as a specific
street address and simply categorized as a "warehouse" because so many of the examples
in this category were street addresses of warehouses. However, we found that the results
were not specific enough. Since 3 digit zip codes are treated the same way as states, this
means that a 3 digit zip code in the Dallas area is treated the same way in the model as
the entire state of Texas. Also, Run 6 shows that modeling the regions so broadly
influences the inverse volume effect. In this run, Point to Point serves as the base case
for the model. For most other runs tested, the inverse volume effect is roughly $25.00 for
the lane. In Run 6, however, the effect is $42.24. This deviation suggests that defining
the lanes so broadly distorts the other variables in the model.
RUN Number 5
R-Squared 91%
(Constant) $ 323.91
Miles $ 1.14
Spot $ 13.71
SpotDist $ 0.14
InverseVolume $ 25.83
OWarehouse $ 114.41
O_3Zip $ 40.38
OState $ 75.71
D_Warehouse $(106.46)
D_5Zip $ 68.20
D_3Zip $ 4.31
D_State $ 50.43
Origin States Included X
Destination States Included x
RUN Number 6
R-Squared 91%
(Constant) $321.18
Miles $ 1.15
Spot $ 12.23
SpotDist $ 0.13
InverseVolume $ 42.24
PointRegion $ 21.14
Region_Point $ (20.76)
RegionRegion $ 69.80
Origin States Included X
Destination States Included X
Figure 10: Cost Effect of Bid Type on Line-Haul Cost
As explained earlier, we first represented regional size effects with the
origin/destination bid types. As explained above, region size was also modeled more
generically with categories representing either a point or a region for both origin and
destination. The results shown in Run 5 are interesting but not complete enough to
explain the total effects of lane aggregation.
The results for the different origin/destination bid types assume the "city to city"
origin destination pairing as the base case. We designed the model this way because this
bid type represents the majority of bids in the dataset. Therefore, the coefficients for
each of the variables are relative to the city to city bid type. Also, the regression program
automatically dropped the 5-digit zip code origin loads, because all loads originating with
a 5-digit zip code were destined for a 5-digit zip code. Also, all loads destined for 5-digit
zip codes originated in 5-digit zip codes. Hence, having both variables in the model was
redundant since one variable inherently represented the effect of both.
There is insufficient data from each origin/destination type in this dataset to be
substantial enough for us to extrapolate results to the entire for-hire TL industry. Many
origin/destination type pairings do not have any data points. To account for this lack of
data points, we broadened the definition of the origin/destination type to simply be
"point" or "region."
In the point and region comparison in Run 6 the "point-to-point" pairing is used
as the base case and the other pairings coefficients are relative to point-to-point. This
general classification does more to explain the effects of aggregation on low-volume
lanes. For example, the results show a $21.52 cost for load going "point-to-region" and a
$22.77 savings for loads going "region-to-point." This effect may be caused by carriers'
desire to get close to a certain place when delivering a load. This could be because the
destination is close to other available loads or it could simply be the home city of the
driver. In any case, the results show that carriers could be willing to offer companies a
$22.77 savings per load if the shippers broadly define the origin point. Regarding lane
aggregation, this could mean that shippers with multiple lanes originating from multiple
locations in a general area moving to a specific destination may be able to save $22.77
per load by aggregating those loads at the origin. However, the results also imply that
companies will lose $21.52 by aggregating at the destination. Therefore, a more
complete independent variable or variable set must be used to clarify these implications.
From the "region to region" variable it is clear that defining the areas too broadly
has costs. But as with the other two variables evaluated above, it is not specific enough
for companies to use for strategy development. These variables could be best used as
broad guidelines that suggest aggregating may have benefits, but they do not supply the
detail necessary to implement aggregation strategy changes.
5.3.3.2 Volume Effects
The InverseVolume variable has already been explained above. The results of
the variable range from $24.88 to $59.41 depending on which regression run the
independent variable is included in. Therefore, this variable must be evaluated based
upon how its cost effects complement and complete the picture that the other variables
included in the model create. In relation to the two variable sets for region size, the
volume effect goes from $25.83 to $42.24. This suggests that the premiums assigned to
the origin and destination are absorbing some of the effects of volume since the volume
premium in that particular run is lower. It may also suggest that the general
categorizations of "point" and "region" may be too broad. If the volume variable
changes by more than 50% when defining region size more broadly, then the model is in
a weaker position to fully explain how increased volume impacts line-haul costs on low-
volume lanes.
N Minimum Mean Madmum Std. Deviation
OriginEmptyMilesSquare 499,272 0 1.40 181 10.1
DestEmptyMilesSquare 499,272 0 5.34 181 20.3
LaneEmptyMilesSquare 499,272 0 6.74 362 25.2
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Empty Mile for Square Regions
The last point with this set of variables is the influence on the model itself. As
shown in Table 8, the distribution of these variables makes the highest possible premium
$59.84 ($0.061 x 981).
5.3.3.3 Empty Miles Effects
As stated above, Run 8 gave effectively identical results to Run 7. Runs 9 and 10
gave results that were not significantly different from Runs 7 and 8, but they show the
effect of empty miles driven across the whole lane. That is, if the empty miles driven at
the origin were 5 and the empty miles driven at the destination were 100, Runs 7 and 8
would calculate the premium paid for each separately. For example, using Run 7, the
premium would be: $0.91 * 5 + $0.50 * 100 = $93.50. However, using Run 9, which
assigns the same price premium to empty miles at the origin and destination, the premium
would be calculated as $0.60 * 105 = $63.00. Comparing Runs 8 and 10 would yield
the same type of result. The greater specificity of Runs 7 and 8 give a more accurate
result, which is why Run 7 was chosen rather than Run 9 or 10.
Empty miles are a key driver in line-haul rate for TL carriers. Also outlined
above is the method used to model empty miles within this study. The results for the
coefficients for both a square area and a circular area tell the same story. Both show
almost a 50% increase in premium for origin empty miles over destination empty miles.
The coefficients are also virtually the same given the difference in area size between a
square area and a circular area ($0.90 and $0.80 for origin empty miles for square and
circle respectively and $0.50 and $0.44 for destination empty miles for square and circle
respectively). The results are also practically the same for the combined lane empty
miles for a square area and circle area ($0.60 and $0.53 respectively). These regression
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results also produce similar results on the volume coefficient variable (ranging between
$24.88 and $26.78).
RUN Number 7 8
R-Squared 91% 91%
(Constant) $322.31 $ 322.31 RUN Number 9 10
Miles $ 1.14 $ 1.14 R-Squared 91% 91%
Spot $ 9.68 $ 9.68 (Constant) $322.40 $ 322.40
SpotDist $ 0.14 $ 0.14 Miles $ 1.14 $ 1.14
InverseVolume $ 26.78 $ 26.78 Spot $ 9.40 $ 9.40
OriginEmptyMilesSquare $ 0.91 SpotDist $ 0.14 $ 0.14
DestEmptyMilesSquare $ 0.50 InverseVolume $ 24.88 $ 24.88
OriginEmptyMilesCircle $ 0.81 LaneEmptyMilesSquare $ 0.60
DestEmptyMilesCircle $ 0.44 LaneEmptyMilesCircle $ 0.54
Origin States Included x x Origin States Included x x
Destination States Included X X Destination States Included X x
Figure 11: Cost Effect of Empty Miles Traveled at Origin and Destination
Runs 11 and 12 show the cost effect per mile based on the ratio between the
distance traveled at the origin and destination and the line-haul distance, using the
variables OrigLHRatioSquare, OrigLHRatioCircle, etc. Once again, the results for
treating the zones as square or circular are interchangeable. The results of these two runs
do not support practical knowledge of the relationship between line-haul distance and
distance traveled at the origin or destination. Intuitively, the larger the line-haul distance
compared to distance traveled empty, the smaller the price premium for traveling empty
miles should be. The model does not accurately capture this effect. Runs 11 and 12 also
significantly distort the other variables in the model. The constant, which for other runs
was around $320, for these two runs dropped to $56. We rejected the results of Run 13
and 14 for the same reason.
RUN Number 11 12
R-SquaredRUN Number 13 14(Constant) $ 56.42 $ 56.42 RUNuber 913 914
Miles $ 1.15 $ 1.15 R-Squared 91% 91%
Spot $ 3.99 $ 3.99 (Constant) $319.63 $ 319.63
SpotDist $ 0.13 $ 0.13 Miles $ 1.15 $ 1.15
InverseVolume $ 58.50 $ 58.50 Spot $ 3.25 $ 3.25
OrigLHRatioSquare $ 0.17 Spot-Dist $ 0.13 $ 0.13
DestLHRatioSquare $ 0.11 InverseVolume $ 59.41 $ 59.41
OrigLHRatioCircle $ 0.20 LaneLHRatioSquare $ 0.06
DestLHRatioCircle $ 0.13 LaneLHRatioCircle $ 0.07
Origin States Included X X Origin States Included X X
Destination States Included X X Destination States Included x x
Figure 12: Cost Effect of Line-Haul Ratio
5.4 Regression by Customer
We tested the model for each customer to see if it yielded similar results on the
customer level. We used the same variables as Run 7 but ran it for each customer. The
results for this exercise were surprising. For each customer, the base model explained
most of the line-haul cost variance, from 91% to 97%. Customers 1 and 2, which
represent over 50% of the total loads, exert a strong influence on the final model. All the
variables were significant for these two customers. Their Constant values were by far the
highest of the set, well above that for the dataset as a whole. The null values in Origin
and Destination Empty Miles reflect the customers' bidding strategies; their bids were all
made as points. For Customer 6, the Destination Empty Miles was insignificant as were
the Origin Empty Miles for Customer 24. This reflects that these two customers bid a
few lanes with region destinations and origins, but that there was not enough volume of
these bids to be significant to the model. Overall, the conclusion that can be drawn from
the results of the regression by customer is that it is impossible to make generalizations
about the market based on a single customer's data. The model's robustness is tied with
the depth and breadth of data from a variety of customers. Based on the full dataset,
however, the model can be applied to each customer.
The model we have developed has yielded results that allow us to quantify the
correlation between lane volume and line-haul rates. We tested several ways to assess
the effect of volume, including by specific and general bid types, but concluded that the
InverseVolume gave the best result because it allowed us to capture the impact that each
additional move on a lane had on cost. In testing several methods to quantify cost of
deadhead at the origin and destination, we were able to capture the cost of each empty
mile driven at the origin and destination. Because aggregation can be done at the origin,
destination, or both, capturing these cost effects individually has greater value than
capturing this cost effect for the lane as a whole, and can assist a shipper in evaluating
where and when aggregation would be most appropriate.
6 Conclusion
Aggregating lanes can lower truckload costs. However, the size of the
aggregation region at the origin and destination will determine whether it would be cost-
effective to aggregate. Whether aggregation will yield cost savings is determined by the
alternative to aggregation. If a shipper is deciding whether to bid a lane as point-to-point
or aggregate it, then one set of criteria should be used. The model can also be used to test
whether aggregation would yield cost savings by eliminating or reducing spot bids. This
second use of the model relies on different variables within the same model. While the
company itself will understand its specific needs and internal obstacles to aggregating
certain lanes, aggregation can either positively or negatively influence prices. Companies
will also have to decide internally how much time savings there is in aggregating versus
having point-to-point lanes across a region. The regression model created in this study
shows the estimated savings by extra load per lane or the cost by empty mile per location.
6.1 Key Variables and Variable Application
Ultimately, there are five key variables in our model that describe the relationship
between the relationship between aggregation and empty miles: InverseVolume,
OriginEmptyMilesSquare, DestEmptyMilesSquare, Spot and SpotDist. Our model
shows that InverseVolume's coefficient is $26.78. Therefore, the dollar amount that
lane volume adds to a given load is calculated by dividing $26.78 by the lane volume for
that load. Lanes with only one load over the two-year period would have a $26.78
premium and lanes with only two loads, or an average of one load per year, have a $13.39
premium. If it is possible to aggregate these single- and double-load lanes to 25-load
lanes over the two years, or 12-13 loads per year, the premium would only be $1.07 per
load.
We understand that these results are only known after the fact, which is a
limitation of the model. The model is not generic, and how many loads will move on a
given lane per year is information that is not known to the shipper or carrier ex ante. To
account for network externalities, other users must rerun the model using their own data.
Empty miles add an extra $0.90 coefficient at the origin and $0.50 coefficient at
the destination. The coefficients for both of these variables are calculated assuming a
square region using (). If a company decides to size a region at 100 square miles at
the origin then there would be a $3.54 premium on each of the loads coming out of that
lane as shown: ()= $3.54.
The relationship between premium on cost per load and the average distance from
the centroid can be used together to find the region size at which costs for a point-to-point
lane are equal to the cost to bid the lane as part of a zone or region. As shown above, the
price premium for a single shipment per annum on a contracted lane is $13.39. To find
the area at which the price premium based on distance driven at the origin is equal to
$13.39, we can set $13.39 equal to the formula for average distance from a centroid,
using square as the region shape multiplied by the price premium per mile for empty
distance driven at the origin, as below:
$13.39 = $0.50 x => $26.78= => 717= => A = 5,737 square miles
So, if lanes that have a single shipment per year can be aggregated into a region that is
smaller than about 5,740 square miles, or about 75 by 75 miles, then it will be more cost
effective to aggregate with another lane or lanes if there are any in proximity to the lane
evaluated. The more loads that move on a point-to-point lane per year, the smaller the
area it would be cost effective to aggregate into. For example, if a lane had four loads per
year, then the premium per load would $26.78/4, or $6.70. Using the same calculation as
above, it would make sense to aggregate this lane only if other lanes could be found
within a zone of 1,434 square miles.
$6.70 = $0.50 x => $13.39 = => 179 = => A
= 1,434 square miles
1,434 square miles is an area of about 38 by 38 miles. So, the more loads per lane, the
less incentive a shipper has to aggregate to realize any cost savings. Performing this
calculation for the destination would yield even smaller region sizes, because the price
premium at the destination is $0.91, almost twice the premium of $0.50 at the origin.
A specific example is the state of California. If a load is bid from a specific city
to the state of California then our model gives the tools necessary to estimate the
premium on each of the loads that are sent from that point to the general region of
California. California is 156,000 square miles so the destination premium would be
$70.00. Therefore, aggregating at this large an area would have costly consequences
since the most the low-volume premium will ever be is $13.39. So the cost of
aggregating at such a large level would always exceed the savings from adding more
volume to the lanes. Companies looking to optimize savings would be better off
choosing a smaller sized region or else the cost of the empty miles will outweigh the
benefits. The economies of scale created by volume on a point to point lane dwarf any
economies of aggregation created by larger regions. The result of our model is very
sensitive to annual volume across a lane. As shown here, it is also sensitive to region
size. Common sense suggests that aggregating to a region the size of California would be
impractical, both due to its sheer size and the diversity of regions within that larger
region. The Los Angeles area would have different market conditions from the Salinas
Valley and the northern part of the state. Shippers and carriers would be aware of this
and would in reality be unlikely to propose the state of California as an origin or
destination region.
6.2 Impact and Implications of the Base Model
The variables that make up the base model support generally accepted
characteristics of the for-hire, TL market. The main drivers of line-haul price are
distance and location. These two factors alone explain 91% of the variance in line-haul
cost.
The constant of $322 is also consistent with general findings in the market. TL
rates are generally bound on the lower end of the distribution by a minimum cost. The
minimum cost in this model is calculated by adding the constant to the product of the
minimum possible miles driven and the coefficient for the variable miles. Since we
eliminated all loads below 250 miles, this results in a minimum cost of $607.31 ($322.31
+ 250*$1.14). As shown in Table 10 below, there are loads that cost below the $607.31
minimum that our model predicts. Because this study is not focused on how minimum
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costs are charged or how backhauls are priced we have not chosen to focus on the full
spectrum of implications in these findings.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
TenderRate 495,394 $193 $7,527 $961.95 $539.236
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for TL Tender Rate
We previously stated the findings for Spot and Spot Dist during the down TL
market in 2008-9. Using the same mathematical procedures we used to find the
minimum cost for a load, we can calculate that the minimum cost for a spot load is
$44.68 ($9.68 + 250*$0.14). For a minimum cost load ($607.31) this would mean that
the cost would escalate to $652.00 and the spot surcharge would be 7% of that cost. In an
industry as massive as the for-hire TL market, a 7% surcharge should not be ignored.
The finding of this model that spot rates are higher than contract rates adds more
support to the assertion that aggregation can save companies money. The savings would
come be avoiding the need to turn to the spot market because there are no contract rates
established for a particular lane. Routing guides that only have point-to-point lanes are
rarely collectively exhaustive and expose shippers to cost of unplanned freight as Harding
showed (2005). Using lanes that are bid to regions enables companies to make their
routing guides collectively exhaustive and more likely to avoid spot bidding. Therefore,
including aggregated lanes in a company's routing guide may not only save money by
lowering the premium associated with low-volume lanes, but it may also save money by
avoiding spot premiums.
Using the model to determine whether to aggregate low-volume point-to-point
lanes suggests that the region size at origin or destination would be relatively low.
However, the model can also be used to assess whether using region in bidding could
reduce the number of spot bids. A shipper should have a sense of where it is likely to
have at least some spot bids, although the nature of spot bids suggests that shippers are
unable to predict all the lanes that will require spot shipments. In our data set for
example, there was a 6% repetition of spot bids in 2008 and 2009. In the event that a
shipper can predict the areas where it is likely to have spot bids, it can use the model to
assess whether it should bid a lane out with a region origin or destination to preclude the
need for spot bids. However, if 94% of the spot volume would be new to the company's
shipping system, as indicated by our data, then shippers would need to create a backup
matrix of contract lanes to prevent paying spot premiums.
In order to use our model to assess whether to bid a lane with a region origin or
destination, companies can perform a similar calculation to the one used above.
However, the shipper would need more information about the shipment, specifically, the
approximate length of haul. For example, if a shipper anticipates that it will have
shipments from somewhere in the Detroit area to the Gary, Indiana area, a distance of
about 250 miles, the minimum for a long-haul shipment, but the shipper does not know
precisely where in the Detroit area the shipment will originate, they can assess the
relative costs using this calculation:
Fixed Cost + Variable Cost * Distance
= Premium per Mile at Origin
* Average Distance from the Centroid =>
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$9.68 + $0.14 * 250 = $0.50 * => $44.68 = A=> 89.36=
A
> 7,985 - => A = 63,882 square miles8
For this distance, a region origin of 63,882 square miles, or about 250 by 250 miles, will
be more cost effective than the premium paid for a spot load. That is, in this example, a
region the same size as the line-haul will yield a better price for the shipper than bidding
the shipment on the spot market. As the distance gets larger, the "region size" will also
grow larger, although it would exceed the boundaries of feasibility for a region. This
corroborates what the data itself shows: a shipper has to pay more for a spot shipment
than a contracted shipment.
So, while a breakpoint can be determined for when it is cost-effective to aggregate
to a region-to-point or point-to-region bidding strategy rather than bid point-to-point, it
will almost always be more cost-effective to establish a contracted region-to-region lane
than to go to the spot market. It is our recommendation that shippers bid out overlapping
lanes: point-to-point lanes that cover forecastable lanes used by the shipper, and region-
to-region lanes to create a collectively exhaustive routing guide for lanes that have a
historic pattern of spot lanes, since our data shows that it is cheaper to ship on a
contracted lane than a spot lane, even during a buyer's market.
There are potential downsides to bidding regions to hedge against using the spot
market. Adding in these additional lanes will increase the time it takes to prepare, bid
out, and manage the routing guide. With just under 1,000 3-digit zip codes in the United
States, covering all potential lanes with region-to-region bids would result in an unwieldy
routing guide. Shippers should be selective in determining where they are likely to have
spot shipments.
Even when aggregation might be appropriate, shippers should take care with how
they choose to present this information. A comparison of identical 5 digit zip code
pairings that were bid as point-to-point, point-to-region, and region-to-point show that the
average price for point-to-point was over $50 less than for point-to-region. For this
particular customer, Customer 7, there was a price break for lanes bid from region-to-
point. According to our contact at CHR the region bid represented a specific set of
origins within the region. Based on the information from him, we deduce that this type of
region is similar to a bid of "City" meaning a specific origin or destination. That is, the
carrier knows that while the origin is not a specific address, it in fact represents a single
point or in the case of Customer 7's regions, a group of specific points, known both to the
shipper and carrier. The shipper got a price break by aggregating. This seems to be sole
scenario in the dataset where aggregation brought a lower price. Simply bidding out an
origin or destination as a region to capture more loads on the broadly-defined lane does
not itself result in cost-savings. The carrier does not have visibility on the points of
origin or destination that will fall within the region origin or destination. Having this
point information is what adds value for the carrier. This is most likely supportive of
Mulqueen's (2006) thesis showing that carriers give discounts for loads terminating in a
known origin point. Our example suggests that the more specific the information a
carrier has about potential lanes, the better they are able to use that information within
their network, driving down prices. Table 10 and Figure 13 give an example of one 5-
digit zip pairing for Customer 7 that had contracted rates of four different types. In this
case the point-to-point rate was roughly equal to one region-to-region lane, 3-digit zip to
3-digit zip but the contract rate for both of these was greater than the region-to-point lane.
This point supports the finding of Hubbard (2001) that less than ideal information affects
a carrier's bid for a lane.
Total
43019 to 37743 City to City State to City 3Zip to 3Zip State to State Shipments
Avg Cost Per Load $ 632 $ 578 $ 616 $ 750 $ 621
Avg Cost Per Mile $ 1.32 $ 1.21 $ 1.29 $ 1.57 $ 1.30
Total Loads 38 7 51 1 97
Length of Haul 478 Miles
Table 10: Example of Lane with Various Bid Types
$1.29/m
$1.32/m
43037
OH TN
$1.57/m
Figure 13: Example of Lane with Various Bid Types
6.3 Application of the model
The model is both simple and comprehensive enough that a broad range of shippers
and carriers can use it to make better informed decisions about their aggregation
strategies. While the model was developed using data from a transportation management
system, the breadth and depth of the data set makes it applicable to users with smaller
scope to their shipping networks. Shippers can use the model to perform a more critical
analysis of the lanes that they bid out to carriers. They can assess potential cost savings
of aggregation in their own networks quickly and easily. The more transportation costs
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impact a shipper's bottom line, the greater the potential benefit from cost savings from
aggregation. Carriers can add value by being able to do a timely cost-benefit analysis of
lanes bid out to them to assess whether a shipper's suggestion of aggregation will add
value to their network. They can also add value to the shipper by offering aggregation of
lanes in a shipper's routing guide if it would result in cost savings.
6.4 Further Research
Our thesis has also uncovered interesting information regarding spot market bids.
Since our data spans a time period during which trucking companies did not have great
bargaining power due to lack of business, further research should be conducted on spot
bids for multiple time periods. Research focused on whether companies pay a premium
for spot bids would be helpful to understand the cost of not having contract rates. If spot
bids are consistently higher than contract rates then companies could use information in
this thesis to ensure they have a collectively exhaustive routing guide. The
competitiveness of spot bid relative to the length of a contract should also be
investigated. If longer contracts or shorter contracts produce better results relative to the
spot market, companies may also be better equipped to decide when to bid new contract
out.
Since our data focused on aggregation's effect on contract rates we did not
examine the truckload industry's brokerage effect on line-haul rates. While most of the
spot bids in our data come from CH Robinson's brokerage business, we have not delved
into all of the ramifications of getting a spot quote. Large variation may exist between
differing truckload brokerage businesses that make further research important before
making conclusions on spot quotes impact on truckload line-haul rates.
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Appendix
A.1: Detail for Run 7 1
ANOVAb
Model
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 131635132174.7 101.0 1303318140.3 49211.0 .0
Residual 13220171247.1 499170.0 26484.3
Total 144855303421.8 499271.0
Model Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
1 (Constant) 318.7 1.2 267.4 .0
Miles 1.1 .0 .8 1475.8 .0
Spot 30.2 1.8 .0 16.5 .0
SpotDist .1 .0 .1 65.7 .0
InverseVolume 26.5 2.2 .0 12.2 .0
OriginEmptyMilesS .9 .0 .0 36.9 .0
quare
DestEmptyMilesSq .5 .0 .0 39.1 .0
uare
OAL -81.2 1.4 .0 -56.7 .0
OAR -95.8 11.4 .0 -8.4 .0
OAZ -150.7 6.0 .0 -24.9 .0
OCA -16.6 1.6 .0 -10.3 .0
OCO -205.2 28.3 .0 -7.2 .0
OCT -437.6 31.9 .0 -13.7 .0
ODC -314.6 57.6 .0 -5.5 .0
ODE -226.3 28.8 .0 -7.9 .0
OFL -389.2 1.8 -. 1 -220.7 .0
OGA -108.0 1.4 .0 -78.7 .0
OIA 63.6 2.4 .0 27.0 .0
OID -716.6 94.0 .0 -7.6 .0
OIL 4.2 1.5 .0 2.8 .0
OIN 18.7 2.4 .0 7.6 .0
OKS 25.8 15.4 .0 1.7 .1
OKY 14.7 4.2 .0 3.5 .0
OLA -203.6 3.2 .0 -63.1 .0
OMA -520.9 1.8 -. 1 -295.6 .0
OMD -358.8 8.6 .0 -41.5 .0
O ME -466.3 21.2 .0 -22.0 .0
OMI -13.6 1.4 .0 -9.4 .0
OMN 181.8 1.9 .0 95.4 .0
O MO -10.3 1.5 .0 -7.0 .0
OMS -6.9 10.1 .0 -. 7 .5
OMT -449.6 115.2 .0 -3.9 .0
ONC -47.6 1.0 .0 -47.4 .0
OND 8.8 18.2 .0 .5 .6
ONE 67.0 19.7 .0 3.4 .0
ONH -387.8 3.4 -. 1 -113.0 .0
ONJ -399.7 1.3 -. 1 -297.5 .0
ONM -213.8 162.8 .0 -1.3 .2
ONV -107.0 2.1 .0 -51.8 .0
ONY -349.1 3.3 .0 -105.8 .0
OOK 107.7 3.7 .O 29.2 .0
OOR -300.7 2.9 .0 -103.8 .0
OPA
ORI
OSC
OSD
OTN
OTX
OUT
OVA
OVT
OWA
O_Wi
OWV
D_AL
D_AR
DAZ
DCA
D_CO
D_CT
D_DC
D_DE
DFL
D_GA
D_IA
DID
DIL
DIN
D_KS
D_KY
D_LA
D_MA
D_MD
D_ME
D_MI
D_MN
DMO
D_MS
D_MT
D_NC
D_ND
D_NE
D_N H
D_NJ
D_NM
DNV
D_NY
D_OH
-311.5
-368.1
-27.9
148.9
-93.4
-196.1
-221.8
-273.5
-436.4
-108.8
59.7
-130.5
-166.6
-122.8
63.7
-246.3
192.2
340.0
-400.6
194.7
259.8
-118.2
-239.4
248.8
-226.5
-190.1
-177.7
-129.3
-72.5
421.7
169.0
510.7
-98.1
-232.4
-191.8
-138.8
700.5
-78.7
50.3
-186.1
434.4
210.3
223.3
-98.7
269.1
-105.3
1.2
32.6
2.7
18.6
1.3
1.0
3.7
3.8
81.4
3.5
1.4
12.2
1.6
2.8
2.0
1.6
2.1
3.7
115.1
10.6
1.3
1.5
1.6
7.3
1.6
2.4
2.5
2.1
1.9
2.1
2.6
2.7
2.0
1.9
1.8
2.2
7.7
1.2
3.6
2.7
3.4
1.8
3.4
2.6
1.7
1.3
-270.6
-11.3
-10.5
8.0
-70.9
-201.2
-60.7
-72.7
-5.4
-31.3
42.6
-10.7
-105.5
-44.1
32.6
-155.7
92.4
90.9
-3.5
18.3
204.0
-78.2
-145.6
34.3
-145.9
-80.3
-71.1
-62.2
-37.8
205.0
65.6
188.9
-48.0
-120.2
-106.8
-63.1
90.7
-64.8
13.8
-68.9
128.0
118.8
64.8
-38.3
158.3
-79.9
DOK
DOR
DPA
D RI
D SC
DSD
DTN
DUT
DVA
DVT
DWA
DWI
DWV
DWY
-23.7
194.5
104.8
443.5
-81.8
61.8
-161.8
251.5
88.0
498.6
319.5
-239.8
1.5
494.6
-7.8
77.3
80.4
49.3
-35.4
10.4
-101.0
100.4
46.7
41.5
142.7
-144.3
.4
109.9
3.0
2.5
1.3
9.0
2.3
6.0
1.6
2.5
1.9
12.0
2.2
1.7
4.1
4.5
______________________ A & a a a
A.2: Regression Runs Using Different Aggregation Methods
RUN Number 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
R-Squared 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91% 91%
(Constant) $ 323.91 $321.18 $322.31 $ 322.31 $322.40 $ 322.40 $ 56.42 $ 56.42 $ 319.63 $ 319.63
Miles $ 1.14 $ 1.15 $ 1.14 $ 1.14 $ 1.14 $ 1.14 $ 1.15 $ 1.15 $ 1.15 $ 1.15
Spot $ 13.71 $ 12.23 $ 9.68 $ 9.68 $ 9.40 $ 9.40 $ 3.99 $ 3.99 $ 3.25 $ 3.25
SpotDist $ 0.14 $ 0.13 $ 0.14 $ 0.14 $ 0.14 $ 0.14 $ 0.13 $ 0.13 $ 0.13 $ 0.13
Inverse Volume $ 25.83 $ 42.24 $ 26.78 $ 26.78 $ 24.88 $ 24.88 $ 58.50 $ 58.50 $ 59.41 $ 59.41
OWarehouse $ 114.41
o_3Zip $ 40.38
oState $ 75.71
DWarehouse $ (106.46)
D_5Zip $ 68.20
D_3Zip $ 4.31
DState $ 50.43
PointRegion $ 21.14
RegionPoint $(20.76)
RegionRegion $ 69.80
OriginEm ptyMilesSquare $ 0.91
Des tEm ptyMiles Square $ 0.50
OriginEmptyMilesCircle $ 0.81
DestEmptyMilesCircle $ 0.44
LaneEm ptyMiles Square $ 0.60
LaneEm ptyMiles Circle $ 0.54
OrigLHRatioSquare $ 0.17
DestLHRatioSquare $ 0.11
OrigLHRatioCircle $ 0.20
DestLHRatioCircle $ 0.13
LaneLHRatioSquare $ 0.06
LaneLHRatioCircle $ 0.07
Origin States Included x x x x _Ix x Ix x x Ix
Destination States Included x x x x x Ix lx x Ix
